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A QUIET WAR: THE JUDICIARY’S STEADY 
AND UNSPOKEN EFFORT TO LIMIT FELONY-
MURDER 
Maggie Davis* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On a Wednesday afternoon a sixteen-year-old boy is hanging 
out after school with four of his friends.1  He is your average 
sixteen-year-old; he has a girlfriend who works at Wendy’s, and 
his current worry is about passing his driving test.  He smokes 
some weed from time to time with his friends, but he has a clean 
criminal record.  After complaining about being broke and 
deciding they have nothing better to do, the five friends elect to 
break into a seemingly vacant home in order to steal some items 
for resale.  He is already thinking about what he will buy with the 
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law, 2021.  Chair of the Board
of Advocates, 2020-2021.  This author thanks Dean Brian Gallini, Willamette University 
College of Law, for his constant guidance, needed edits, and heartfelt encouragement 
throughout the writing process.  The author would also like to thank the hardworking team 
members of the Arkansas Law Review, whether cite checking a clean edit or conducting a 
super cite, your work is noticed, appreciated, and much needed.  The author thanks her father 
for always encouraging her to go after her dreams, especially the dreams that pursued a career 
in law, and modeling how an amazing attorney balances life and work.  The author thanks 
her brother for setting the bar high and who always believed she could achieve this.  She 
thanks her mother for being the rock of the family and for her steadfast advice, support and 
love.  Finally, the author thanks her husband for always believing in her and for his selfless 
love during life and law school. 
1. These facts are adapted from Blake Layman’s felony-murder conviction in 2013.
See Ed Pilkington, Felony Murder: Why a Teenager Who Didn’t Kill Anyone Faces 55 Years 
in Jail, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2015),  [https://perma.cc/44WY-BDAM].  See also Layman v. 
State, 17 N.E.3d 957, 960-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).  Blake Layman is one of many defendants 
convicted of felony-murder who did not murder the victim.  See e.g., Wilson v. State, 68 
S.W.2d 100, 101-02 (Ark. 1934) (holding defendant liable for victim’s death when used as 
shield and shot by police); People v. Caldwell, 681 P.2d 274, 281 (Cal. 1984) (holding 
defendant liable for co-felon’s death after robbery of Church’s Fried Chicken and following 
police shoot-out); State v. Kress, 253 A.2d 481, 483, 485, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1969) (holding defendant liable for bystander’s death caused by police during bank robbery); 
People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. 1993) (defendant held liable for undercover 
officer’s death caused by another officer during attempted robbery). 
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extra cash while knocking on the home’s door to double-check 
that it is empty.  He thinks he does not receive a reply, making the 
unarmed break-in easy.  But within minutes, everything changes.  
The boys realize they are not alone, as evident by the 
homeowner’s gun shots firing at the panicked teens.  The kid has 
never even held a gun but is now shot in the leg.  The sixteen-
year-old’s vision blurs from the pain, but not in time to miss his 
friend collapse dead beside him.  Only four boys remain living 
when the police arrest them each for murder.  Although none of 
the teenagers touched a weapon during the robbery, the surviving 
boys are each convicted of felony-murder in connection with the 
death of the fifth robber.  
A young man, X, puts on his Bulls jacket before stepping out 
into a damp Chicago evening.2  X meets up with a friend because 
the plan is to rob three others who have given them trouble.  His 
job was to force one of the three down an alley with a gun, for 
added effect.  All was going according to plan until something 
unexpected happened.  The victim seized the gun and, now joined 
by his friends in the alley, X is outnumbered and gun-less as the 
trio beat him in the dark.  X escapes and runs to an open street 
corner.  During his flight, he hears gunshots and a woman scream.  
Still running, he turns his jacket inside out, hoping to blend in.  
The disguise does not prevent his police capture.  And the fact 
that he did not kill the woman who died during his escape does 
not prevent his charge and conviction for her murder. 
An abusive father takes his family on a camping trip a couple 
of hours away.3  As a punishment, the father purposely impels his 
son’s anal cavity with a stick before finishing the day’s camping 
activities.  The child’s health quickly deteriorates on the drive 
home.  Doctors pronounce the six-year-old dead later that 
evening.  The father was charged with felony-murder.4  
2. These descriptions were created from the record in Antonio Lowery’s prosecution
in 1997.  See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ill. 1997). 
3. These facts are minimally adapted from Mauricio Torres’ trial in 2019.  See Torres
v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 15, 571 S.W.3d 456, 466-67 (Womack, J., dissenting).
4. As of this article’s completion in March 2020, Mauricio Torres had been convicted
for murder of his son twice.  Tracy Neal, Judge Declares Mistrial in Arkansas Murder Case 
After Stepson Lunges at Defendant, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Mar. 6, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/VHL2-439J] [hereinafter Neal, Mistrial].  The first conviction was 
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These are the imbalanced stories that produce media 
headlines like “Charged With Murder Without Killing Anyone,”5 
“Controversial Law Charges People with Murder for Death at 
Others’ Hand,”6 and “In the US, You Don’t Have to Kill to Be a 
Murderer.”7  The inconsistent, unreliable, and often absurd 
felony-murder convictions have flooded this nation’s adversarial 
process since the first felony-murder statute.  To be sure, reform 
efforts exist.8  Legislators have, for instance, rewritten statutes in 
an effort to identify an optimal amendment.9  As evident by the 
continued ambiguity in felony-murder convictions, those largely 
piecemeal efforts to clean-up a dated and widely criticized 
doctrine have failed. 
This Article makes two arguments.  First, it asserts that a 
recent Arkansas decision in Torres v. State10 signals a subtle but 
important shift in judicial efforts to reform application of the 
felony-murder doctrine.  Second, it challenges state courts to 
build on Torres and affirmatively impose a uniform judicial 
limitation on felony-murder statutes—wholly apart and 
notwithstanding any separate legislative reform efforts.  
Part I examines the debated theories of how the felony-
murder rule arrived in America and highlights the historic pattern 
of the jurisdictions choosing to limit the felony-murder doctrine.  
Part II assesses the fifty states’ different applications of the 
legislature’s textual limitations and further judiciary-imposed 
restrictions of the felony-murder doctrine. 
Part III explores how Arkansas, in particular, has applied its 
felony-murder statute in comparison to other states with similar 
felony-murder rules.  It then focuses on how Torres v. State 
narrowly construed application of the felony murder doctrine.  
overturned and remanded for retrial, and the second conviction was declared a mistrial during 
the sentencing phase.  Id. 
5. Christie Thompson, Charged with Murder Without Killing Anyone, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2015), [https://perma.cc/BR6R-KTCA]. 
6. Duaa Eldeib, Controversial Law Charges People with Murder for Death at Others’
Hand, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2016), [https://perma.cc/LR2L-GL5X]. 
7. Jessica Lussenhop, In the US, You Don’t Have to Kill to Be a Murderer, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/JS99-Y2WU]. 
8. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
9. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
10. Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, 571 S.W.3d 456.
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Next, Part III explains the correct analysis of jurisdictional 
statutes in relation to particular felonies and how that analysis 
changes with felony-murder.  Part III then argues that Arkansas’ 
treatment of the predicate felony in Torres was an incorrect and 
misguided attempt to limit the scope of the felony-murder 
doctrine.  That restrictive approach, however, provides another 
illustration of ongoing judicial attempts to limit the scope of 
felony-murder.  When considered historically, the judiciary’s 
limiting efforts are, to put it charitably, disingenuous.  In an effort 
to clarify the scope and reach of the felony-murder rule, some 
meaningful uniform approach is critically necessary.  From that 
analysis, Part III concludes by challenging states to continue to 
judicially amend the felony-murder doctrine and proposes a 
uniform judicial limitation that strictly interprets felony-murder 
statutes when legislators continue to be silent in abolishing the 
doctrine. 
I. FELONY-MURDER ARRIVAL AND
ALTERATION: AN EARLY APPROACH 
Common law felony-murder is a controversial doctrine and 
has been since its initial adoption, as seen through its 
commentator’s critiques and diverse application across the 
states.11  Common law felony-murder provides that if a homicide 
occurs during a felony or attempted commission of a felony, that 
homicide is murder.12  Malice aforethought is the mens rea 
element of common law murder.13  But malice, in the felony-
murder context, is implied by the mens rea of the predicate 
felony.14  Thus, proof of the underlying felony provides the 
11. Jennifer DeCook Hatchett, Kansas Felony Murder: Agency or Proximate Cause?,
48 U. KAN. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2000); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-
Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446 
(1985); see generally Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
403, 465-75 (2011) [hereinafter Binder, Making the Best]. 
12. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 522 (5th ed. 2009);
Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1047; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020). 
13. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1047; 40 AM.
JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020). 
14. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1047; 40 AM.
JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020). 
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malice requirement for murder.15  That approach—imputing 
malice—enables the state to charge murder from a range of 
factual behavior, anywhere from a reckless disregard for the risk 
of human life to an entirely accidental death.16  Application of the 
felony-murder doctrine varies across jurisdictions.17  Depending 
on a specific statute’s wording, it can reach the conduct of any 
felon, agent of the felon, or any person that proximately caused 
any death during the unlawful activity.18   
Scholarly articles, courts, and legislative commentaries have 
heavily criticized the felony-murder doctrine.19  The rule has 
allies in those who believe the doctrine deters criminals from 
committing felonies that could produce a death by encouraging 
them to be more careful during felonies that could potentially 
cause a death.20  Supporters rationalize the rule on a retribution 
basis, in that a crime which involves a death “should be punished 
more severely than the same crime that does not [result] in 
death[.]”21  The majority of commentators attack the expansive 
rule because of its uneven application to the defendant’s actual 
conduct committed and the automatic result with which he is 
charged.22  Moreover, they argue that a criminal would have to 
know about the felony-murder rule and its wide-casting 
15. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020).
16. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020);
Leonard Birdsong, Felony Murder: A Historical Perspective by Which to Understand 
Today’s Modern Felony Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006). 
17. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
18. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5(d), at 615-20 (3d
ed. 2018).  Causation is a required element of felony-murder cases, as in other homicide case. 
Id. at 615.  It is possible, in the context of felony murder, the death could be either a response 
to the defendants conduct or a mere coincidence, only present to be acted upon by the 
defendant’s acts.  Id. at 616.  Courts apply the foreseeability test to establish the defendant’s 
unlawful act as the proximate cause.  Id. at 615-16.  
19. See Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3.  The rule has been “described as ‘astonishing’
and ‘monstrous,’ an unsupportable ‘legal fiction,’ ‘an unsightly wart on the skin of the 
criminal law,’ and as an ‘anachronistic remnant’ that has ‘no logical or practical basis for 
existence in modern law.’”  Roth & Sundby, supra note 11, at 446.  See also DRESSLER, 
supra note 12, at 521; LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 644-45.   
20. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965); Birdsong, supra note
16, at 2-3; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1048; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60, (2020). 
21. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 523; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1048; see Roth &
Sundby, supra note 11, at 457-60. 
22. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1049; Roth & Sundby,
supra note 11, at 446. 
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application before commencing the crime for either deterrence or 
retributive paralogical norms to appropriately apply.23 
Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder doctrine 
is typically taught to every first-year law student in his or her 
criminal law course.24  It remains taught because the doctrine is 
alive and well today.25  Indeed, some form of a felony-murder 
statute can be found in almost every jurisdiction in the United 
States.26  Although prevalent, current felony-murder statutes look 
vastly different from their historical common law predecessors.27  
This highlights an important question: why has the doctrine 
changed? 
The story begins with a debate over whether the American 
felony-murder doctrine was adopted from the English common 
law.28  Rather than extensive judicial decisions interpreting the 
use of the felony-murder rule, the English common law seems to 
only note scholarly and clerical commentaries introducing the 
concept.29  Rooted in Christian ethics, the first idea may have 
derived from the overarching view that unintended harms could 
be punished if they were the result of unlawful acts.30   
In 1235, scholars paused for the first time to think about the 
potential implications of the expansive felony-murder doctrine 
and attempted to limit its applicability.31  Commentator Henry de 
Bracton assessed the culpability of a person when an 
unintentional killing resulted from a lawful or unlawful act and 
concluded that accidental killings were not considered homicides 
because they lacked the intention to injure.32  In contrast, in 1619, 
23. Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1049.
24. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 521-22; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 13; see
generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 604. 
25. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 521-22; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1050;
Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3; see generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion. 
26. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3; see generally infra Part II and accompanying
discussion. 
27. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 605-07; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
28. See generally Birdsong, supra note 16, at 4-12.
29. Id. at 4-5; Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 59, 73 (2004) [hereinafter Binder, Origins].
30. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 5; Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 73.
31. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 74-75; Brian R. Gallini, Equal Sentences for
Unequal Participation: Should the Eighth Amendment Allow All Juvenile Murder 
Accomplices to Receive Life Without Parole?, 87 OR. L. REV. 29, 80 n.281 (2008). 
32. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 74-75; Gallini, supra note 31, at 80 & n.281.
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commentator Michael Dalton made a general proposition that it 
was conceivable that an accidental killing in the course of an 
unlawful act could in fact be felonious.33  Still later in 1628, 
Edward Coke asserted that a person should be charged for 
unintentional deaths even if they resulted from intentional 
unlawful acts.34   
During the end of the seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale 
of Kent, Lord Chief Justice in England, further refined Coke’s 
view of murder.35  Lord Hale focused his interpretation on the 
unlawful act in order to establish a degree of homicide by 
requiring a mental state of “intent to harm,” somewhat analogous 
with the particular enumerated felonies found in modern felony-
murder statutes.36  Although the concept of felony-murder was 
intertwined in scholarly discussions, skeptics of American 
felony-murder being adopted from English common law rely on 
the great lack of English judicial decisions actually using the 
doctrine.37   
Early American colonies were further influenced to narrow 
the doctrine by Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, in which he proposed a rule focusing on the 
dangerousness of the predicate crime rather than its categorical 
quality as a “felony.”38  Blackstone’s theory stated that the initial 
intent to commit one felony sufficed for the unintended felonious 
result, then applied an enhanced proportion of punishment 
applicable when an involuntary killing happened as the 
consequence of an unlawful act.39  American jurisdictions’ varied 
and dispersed adoption of felony-murder rules indicates the 
states’ unwillingness to adopt the doctrine in its overly broad 
common law form.40  Therefore, it is likely that colonial 
Americans were simply familiar with the expansive English 
common law felony-murder doctrine, introduced through English 
legal commentators and Blackstone’s commentaries, then chose 
33. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 8; Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 81.
34. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 81-82.
35. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 11.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 65.
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to limit its application when adopting it into various American 
jurisdictions.41   
In 1794, Pennsylvania became the first of many jurisdictions 
to take a shot at refining the doctrine.42  Pennsylvania chose to 
affirmatively narrow felony-murder by introducing America’s 
first statute that limited its application to specific felonies.43  The 
murder grading statute aggravated murder liability based on 
participation in the specific listed felonies.44  The statute stated:  
“[A]ll murder . . . or which shall be committed in the perpetration 
or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, 
shall be deemed murder in the first degree . . . .”45  The statute 
implied that any murder in the course of an enumerated felony did 
not require the willful, deliberate, and premeditated mindset 
element required elsewhere by the first-degree murder statute.46  
Yet, it restricted the breadth of felony-murder by deciding that the 
particular felonious acts listed (“arson, rape, robbery, or 
burglary”) were the only legislatively selected inherently 
dangerous felonies.47  Pennsylvania’s reform sparked a 
nationwide overhaul of homicide statutes; thirty-one states 
adopted a version of its grading scheme, twelve of which made 
little to no textual changes.48  
41. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 25-26.
42. See Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 17.
43. The Pennsylvania statute states:
[A]ll murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by laying in
wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder in the first degree; and all
other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree.
Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1766, § 2, 1794 Pa. Laws 186, 187 (current version at 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 2502 (1978)); Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 
17. 
44. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1766, § 2, 1794 Pa. Laws 186, 187 (current version at 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502); Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16, 
at 17. 
45. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 17.
Pennsylvania chose to statutorily limit application of felony-murder by providing that 
commission of only certain felonies could expose the defendant to capital punishment. 
Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119. 
46. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 18.
47. Id. at 17-18.
48. Id.
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The nineteenth century was a time of trial and error for the 
felony-murder doctrine through its widespread adoption and 
drastic differences in scope.49  Jurisdictions tried defining felony-
murder with variations of three different textual-limiting 
approaches, predicating liability on: (1) express or implied malice 
shown through the commission of any violent or dangerous 
felony; (2) one of the several dangerous enumerated felonies, or 
(3) any felony.50
In 1827, Illinois employed the first approach when the
legislature attempted to textually limit its felony murder statute.51  
Illinois defined murder as an unlawful killing with express or 
implied malice and was the first to statutorily address unintended 
killings in the course of a felony.52  Illinois’s statute stated: 
“involuntary killing . . . in the commission of an unlawful act 
which in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a 
human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious 
intent, . . . shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder.”53  The 
Illinois judiciary then sought to further limit its application by 
applying the doctrine to only inherently dangerous felonies.54 
Dissatisfied with current applications, New Jersey, only a 
couple of years later in 1829, arguably broadened the scope of the 
felony-murder doctrine.55  The New Jersey murder statute 
included a killing “in committing, or attempting to commit 
sodomy, rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, or any unlawful act 
against the peace of this state, of which the probable consequence 
may be bloodshed . . . .”56  Although New Jersey attempted to 
narrow the Illinois approach by enumerating specific inherently 
dangerous felonies, its catch-all “unlawful act” phrase created an 
49. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119.
50. Id. at 121, 161-62.
51. Id. at 120-21, 162.
52. Id. at 120-21; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 18-19.
53. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
54. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 162.
55. Id. at 121; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
56. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121 (quoting Act of Feb. 17, 1829, § 66, 1828-
1829 N.J. Acts 109, 128 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017)); 
Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19. 
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all-encompassing list that likely did nothing to alter the doctrine’s 
previous application.57  
That same year, the New York legislature enacted its own 
version of a felony-murder statute.58  It defined murder as any 
killing “without any design to effect death, by a person engaged 
in the commission of any felony.”59  However, the judiciary, 
displeased with the text’s expansive nature, again chose to narrow 
the application creating a “merge[r] limitation[,]” which required 
the predicate felony to have a purpose independent of the 
homicide.60  Thus, if the predicate that caused the death was 
assaultive in nature, it merged with the death and disallowed an 
additional felony-murder charge.61   
Moving forward, jurisdictions borrowed from these three 
approaches—inherently dangerous felony, enumerated felonies, 
or any felony—to create their own felony-murder statutes with 
the common goal of attempting to perfect a tailoring system for 
the expansive doctrine.62  Further, when textual decisions by the 
legislature frustrated criminal justice, the judiciary stepped in to 
narrow the statutes’ application.63  Consequently, the various 
versions of the felony-murder rule only further complicated and 
diversified the doctrine’s application from state to state.64 
The varied scope of the rule from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
displeased the bench, bar, and media alike.65  In response, the 
American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the Model Penal Code 
(MPC) in 1962 to clarify and simplify the United States’ criminal 
common law.66  In the context of felony-murder, MPC § 210.2, 
the MPC’s murder provision, states:  
57. See Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
58. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 171-72.
59. Id. at 121 & n.312, 171-72; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
60. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 173 (internal quotations omitted); see People v.
Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 592-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). 
61. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 173.
62. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 607-10; see generally infra Part II and
accompanying discussion. 
63. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
64. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121 & n.313; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
65. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 30; MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW:
MODEL PENAL CODE 8 (2002). 
66. Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE, at xi-xii (AM. L. INST.
1984); DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 30; DUBBER, supra note 65, at 8. 
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[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when . . . it is
committed recklessly . . .  [s]uch recklessness and
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery,
rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force,
arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.67
Although, at first glance, it does not seem the MPC 
drastically clarified or altered the current interpretation of the 
doctrine,68 the Explanatory Note for MPC § 210.2 makes plain 
that the MPC purposively departed from the traditional felony-
murder rule.69  The commentary indicates that the drafters 
intended to abandon felony-murder as an independent basis of 
liability.70  Instead, it listed specific felonies that established a 
presumption of recklessness and indifference to the value of 
human life.71  The drafters described the presumption as “a 
concession to the facilitation of proof” that was persuasive rather 
than the deciding liability factor.72  This marked the first time that 
noted American law professors, judges, attorneys, and other 
professionals in the legal profession were outspoken with their 
disdain for the felony-murder rule by eliminating its existence in 
the proposed code.73 Despite the MPC’s efforts, inconsistent 
iterations of felony-murder persist at the state level to this day.74  
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
68. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 548-49; DUBBER, supra note 65, at 5.
69. The explanatory note to Pt. II, Art. 210 provides as follows:
Section 210.2(1)(b) establishes a presumption that the requisite recklessness and indifference 
to the value of human life exist when a homicide is committed during the course of certain 
enumerated felonies.  This presumption has the effect of abandoning the strict liability 
aspects of the traditional felony-murder doctrine but at the same time recognizing the 
probative significance of the concurrence of homicide and a violent felony. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note. 
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note; DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 548-
49. 
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. at 30; Roth & Sundby, supra note 11, at 472.
73. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note.
74. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
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II. CURRENT APPLICATION IN THE FIFTY
STATES 
Two centuries after Pennsylvania’s first revision of the 
felony-murder doctrine, the doctrine remains in disarray.75  Every 
jurisdiction arguably applies a different combination of 
applicable predicate felonies and interpretation of other judicial 
and textual limitations.76  This Part explores statewide statutory 
and judicial reform efforts organized on a range, beginning first 
with the two states that have statutorily eliminated the felony-
murder doctrine.77  It then focuses on the great minority of states 
that chose not to include an enumerated list of predicate felonies 
by exploring their textual limitations and judicial application of 
the doctrine.78  It finishes by examining the vast majority of states 
that enumerate specific felonies in the statutes’ text and other 
limitations that either the legislators or judiciary chose to 
impose.79   
Despite nearly uniform dissatisfaction with the felony-
murder rule, only two jurisdictions have statutorily abolished the 
doctrine.80  Hawaii, by statute, “eliminated from [Hawaii’s] law 
the felony-murder rule.”81 The statute’s commentary thoroughly 
explained that the legislator’s choice to abolish was based off 
felony-murder’s “history of . . . condemnation,”82 a judicial trend 
limiting felony-murder rule’s scope, and a concern about the 
doctrine’s underlying illogic.83  Hawaii discredited the doctrine’s 
purpose—to deter—and highlighted that the felony-murder rule 
produced “extremely questionable results” across jurisdictions.84  
75. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
76. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
77. See generally infra p. 13 and accompanying discussion.
78. See generally infra pp. 13-15 and accompanying discussion.
79. See generally infra pp. 15-18 and accompanying discussion.
80. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (2016) (Felony-Murder Rule); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt. (West 1974); Birdsong, supra note 16, at 20 n.135; 
Gallini, supra note 31, at 82. 
81. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (Felony-Murder Rule).
82. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (2016) (Felony-Murder Rule); Criminal Law:
Felony-Murder Rule—Felon’s Responsibility for Death of Accomplice, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
1496, 1496 (1965). 
83. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (Felony-Murder Rule).
84. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (Felony-Murder Rule).
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Kentucky also “abandon[ed] the doctrine . . . as an 
independent basis . . . of homicide.”85  Rather, deaths that occur 
in the course of another felony must either (1) be intentional; or 
(2) occur with wanton extreme indifference to human life.86  The
commentary explains the adaptation was a shift to model the MPC
in its homicide statute.87
Judicial reform efforts to the felony-murder rule are, unlike 
statutory revisions, far more common.88  That has, however, only 
served to create more confusion.89  Only Michigan90 and 
Massachusetts91 have judicially abolished the felony-murder rule.  
In direct opposition, South Carolina is the only state that solely 
employs the common law felony-murder rule through judicial 
decision.92   
Forty-seven states have adopted felony-murder by statute; 
however, each textual description and application of the rule 
greatly differs from state-to-state.93  Consider first that only 
85. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt. (West 1974).
86. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt.  Otherwise, if the death
lacks extreme indifference, it is considered manslaughter. 
87. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt.
88. See generally infra pp. 14, 16-19 and accompanying discussion.
89. See generally infra pp. 14, 16-19 and accompanying discussion.
90. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980).  See also LAFAVE, supra
note 18, at 645.  However, the textual predicate felonies are still applied in the listed statute. 
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 321-22. 
91. Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173, 1191 (Mass. 2017) (deciding felony-
murder will no longer be an independent theory of liability for murder outside its statutory 
rule). 
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(a)(1) (2010).  The South Carolina murder statute
reads: “[m]urder is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express of 
implied.”  S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2019) (internal quotations omitted).  The judiciary 
has chosen to adopt felony-murder yet has struggled with concretely defining malice in order 
to apply the doctrine.  See Binder, Making the Best, supra note 11, at 446.  In 2007, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that malice cannot be automatically presumed from 
participation in a felony.  Lowry v. State, 657 S.E.2d 760, 764 (S.C. 2008).  Although the 
court held that malice was a distinct element, it did not define malice in the context of felony-
murder.  See id.  South Carolina’s Pattern Jury Instruction is slightly more helpful.  See 
Binder, supra, at 447.  The proposed murder instruction defines malice as hatred or ill-will 
through a reckless disregard of a risk to human life or a “heart . . . fatally bent on mischief.”  
RALPH KING ANDERSON JR., S.C. REQUESTS TO CHARGE: CRIM. § 2-1 (2d ed. 2012).  The 
instructions also state that malice is intentionally doing a wrongful act without just cause or 
excuse; however, they do not clarify if these requirements are in addition or separate from 
one another.  See id.; Binder, supra, at 447. 
93. See infra Appendix I (listing forty-seven state statutes that have textually adopted
felony-murder).  A total of forty-eight states apply felony-murder when adding South 
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thirteen states94 have statutes that apply to a defendant’s 
commission or attempt to commit95 “a felony,”96 “any felony,”97 
“a forcible felony,”98 or “an inherently dangerous felony.”99  
Lacking any statutory limitations from the legislators, some 
judiciaries chose to limit the felony-murder doctrine only to 
“inherently dangerous” felonies; however, defining “inherently 
dangerous” differs from state-to-state.100  To determine if the 
predicate felony is inherently dangerous, the judiciary applies 
either an “on the facts”101 or “in the abstract”102 test, both of which 
can yield different results using the same fact pattern.103   
Carolina’s judicial application.  See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(a)(1).  The District of 
Columbia also textually adopts felony-murder; however, it is not included in this “state” 
count.  D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (2001). 
94. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2014); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2020); IOWA CODE § 707.2 
(2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 1 (2020) 
(stating a crime punishable with death or life imprisonment is murder in the first degree); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2903.02 (West 1972); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (1978); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(c)(a)(1) (applying common law felony-murder); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 
1994). 
95. Variations of “commission or attempt to commit” greatly vary across states.  See
infra Appendix IV. 
96. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502.
97. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1.  Delaware adds
“engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit any felony[.]”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636. 
98. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1; IOWA CODE § 707.2.
99. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402.  Massachusetts uses the language “a crime
punishable with death or imprisonment for life” in attempt to clarify inherently dangerous 
felony.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 1. 
100. People v. Lopez, 489 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Cal. 1971).  In Rhode Island, the predicate
felony “escape” was found to be inherently dangerous on the facts.  See State v. Miller, 161 
A. 222, 225 (R.I. 1932).  However, in California, escape was not inherently dangerous using
in the abstract limitation.  See People v. Lopez, 489 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Cal. 1971).
101. To apply an “on the facts” test, a court will consider the facts and circumstances
of the particular case to determine if such felony was inherently dangerous in the manner and 
circumstances in which it was committed.  DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 527.  See, e.g., 
Mosley v. State, 536 S.E.2d 150, 152-53 (Ga. 2000). 
102. To apply an “in the abstract” test, a court will ignore the facts of a specific case
and, instead, look at the offense as it is defined by the statute to see if the offense, by its very 
nature, cannot be committed without carrying a high probability that death will result. 
DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 526.  See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal. 
1989). 
103. See supra note 100.  Note some jurisdictions apply both tests, finding a predicate
felony sufficient for a felony-murder charge if it is inherently dangerous under either 
approach.  DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 527. 
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By contrast, the other thirty-five states’ legislators104 
attempted to statutorily limit felony-murder by enumerating 
particular felonies.105  When it comes to the particular felonies 
listed, there is, again, inconsistency.106  Statutes range from listing 
only six107 or up to twenty-two predicate felonies.108  Those may 
include a range of factual behaviors like delivery of a controlled 
substance109 or shooting of a firearm with intent to kill.110  Most 
states do enumerate a degree of arson, rape, robbery, burglary, 
and kidnapping.111 
Beyond textually limiting the doctrine through an 
enumerated list, a range of inconsistent statutory limitations 
pervade.112  For example, some jurisdictions textually limit 
liability based on who committed the killing.113  A handful of 
jurisdictions’ statutes limit felony-murder application to deaths 
caused by the defendant or another participant.114  Other 
jurisdictions have textually limited the doctrine by eliminating a 
defendant’s liability solely to when the deceased was a co-
104. Note that District of Columbia has also adopted felony-murder with an
enumerated list; however, it is not noted in this “state” count.  D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (2001). 
105. See infra Appendix II (listing thirty-five state statutes that have enumerated
particular felonies); Appendix III (mapping states with enumerated felonies); Birdsong, 
supra note 16, at 21-22, 24; see LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 610-11.  Note that Michigan 
statutorily adopts felony-murder in the first degree with an enumerated list; however, 
judicially abolished the common law application of the doctrine.  People v. Aaron, 299 
N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980). 
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(West 2020); FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2019). 
107. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301
(2018). 
108. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West 2009).
109. See, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2008).
110. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 (2012).
111. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1991). 
112. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2019) (textually limiting liability
extending to co-felon); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (West 1972) (requiring death be 
proximate cause of felony); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2020) (textually limiting liability 
extending co-felon or victim). 
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2019) (textually mitigating charge to second-
degree murder if death was committed by co-felon); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2013) 
(textually limiting liability to “any person legally accountable for the crime”). 
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
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felon.115  Still other jurisdictions have chosen to put both of these 
limitations into their statutes’ wording.116   
When no statutory language expressly constrains the felony-
murder rule, courts choose to either read in limitations or reject 
their application.117  Courts have inconsistently interpreted the 
language of a statute to reach different results when deciding 
whether to extend liability to deaths caused by police officers118 
or victims of the intended felony.119  More disarray exists when 
115. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2019); Hatchett, 
supra note 11, at 1060 n.97. 
116. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2019).  For another example, Washington’s
first-degree murder statute states: “[h]e or she commits or attempts to commit the crime of 
[enumerated felonies] and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate 
flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than 
one of the participants . . . .”  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1975) (emphasis added). 
117. Compare State v. Bonner, 411 S.E.2d 598, 598-99 (N.C. 1992) (declining to
extend liability to defendant when police killed co-felon), and State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 
30 (N.J. 1997) (holding liability does not extend to defendant when victim killed co-felon), 
with Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 1978) (upholding defendant’s charge when 
police killed co-felon), and State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 404-05 (Wis. 1994) (judicially 
extending liability to defendant when victim killed co-felon).  See also Sheriff, Clark Cty. v. 
Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev. 1973) (refusing to extend liability to defendant when victim 
killed co-felon).  See generally Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1063-78.   
118. For example, both the California and Pennsylvania murder statute use the
language “in the perpetration . . . of a felony[.]”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2020); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT.  § 2502 (1978).  Note that, California has an enumerated list of applicable 
felonies.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.  Although both jurisdictions share the same textual 
limitation, the California judiciary in Caldwell, expanded the doctrine to reach the defendant 
for conduct of the police officer; by contrast, Pennsylvania’s judiciary in Redline refused to 
apply the doctrine.  Compare People v. Caldwell, 681 P.2d 274, 281 (Cal. 1984) (judicially 
extending liability to defendant when police killed co-felon), with Commonwealth v. 
Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 482-83 (Pa. 1958) (refusing to extend liability to defendant when 
police killed co-felon). 
119. Compare State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 1992) (holding liability
does not extend to defendant when victim killed bystander), with People v. Lowery, 687 
N.E.2d 973, 977-78 (Ill. 1997) (extending liability to defendant when victim killed 
bystander). 
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courts decide to apply the doctrine when an officer inadvertently 
kills a victim,120 bystander,121 or another officer.122 
Rather than parse out the role the shooter or victim played, 
some jurisdictions judicially interpret other statutory language in 
a limiting fashion.123  Some states textually require only that the 
death be “in the course of and in furtherance of the [felony] . . . or 
in immediate flight[.]”124  When explicit statutory language about 
flight is lacking, courts have interpreted liability to continue 
during flight from the predicate felony.125  Then, courts, state-to-
state, disagree about when flight ends.126  Therefore, some courts 
have attempted to clarify the felony-murder rule’s scope by 
narrowing the applicability only to deaths proximately caused by 
120. Compare Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100, 101-02 (1934)
(upholding defendant charge when police killed victim), with Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 
N.E.2d 308, 312-13 (Mass. 1965) (holding defendant not liable when police killed victim). 
121. Compare State v. Kress, 253 A.2d 481, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969)
(holding defendant liable when police killed bystander), with Hill v. State, 295 S.E.2d 518, 
521 (Ga. 1982) (denying liability to defendant when police killed bystander), overruled by 
State v. Jackson, 697 S.E.2d 757, 767 (Ga. 2010).  
122. Compare People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. 1993) (holding
defendant liable when police killed another officer), with Commonwealth ex. rel. Smith v. 
Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (Pa. 1970) (refusing to extend liability to defendant when police 
killed another officer). 
123. Delaware’s murder statute textually limits felony-murder to deaths caused
recklessly, while the judiciary further limits the doctrine by requiring a causal connection 
between the death and predicate felony.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013); see Comer 
v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 338-39 (Del. 2009) (holding that a defendant is not liable for death
caused by victim).
124. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016).
125. Commonly referred to as the res gestae requirement, the felony-murder rule
applies to homicides that occur while the felony is being committed and “continues, even 
after commission of the crime, while the felon flees the scene.”  DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 
530. See, e.g., People v. Salas, 500 P.2d 7, 15 (Cal. 1972) (applying liability to defendant
for death occurring in flight of predicate felony although limitation was not textually in
statute).
126. Compare Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 656 (Colo. 2005) (holding “immediate
flight terminates when a sole participant in the subject felony is subject to complete custody, 
or, alternatively, when all participants in a predicate felony involving more than one 
participant are subject to complete custody”), and  People v. Wilkins, 295 P.3d 903, 910 
(Cal. 2013) (extending liability to deaths during “continuous transaction” of crime including 
flight until reached place of temporary safety), with State v. Lucero, 64 P.3d 191, 194 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003) (holding “[n]o Arizona case has adopted the doctrine that flight ends when a 
suspect has reached a place of temporary safety”). 
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the predicate felony.127  Still unpleased with the doctrine’s 
inconsistent and imbalanced results, multiple states, under certain 
circumstances, provide defendants with an affirmative defense 
that limits felony-murder to reasonably foreseeable deaths.128  
Still other examples of statutory and judicial inconsistency 
exist.129 One jurisdiction textually requires an additional mens rea 
beyond mere intent to commit the underlying felony.130 Other 
courts limit felony-murder through the “merger doctrine,”131  
which requires that the predicate felony be independent from the 
homicide.132  In other words, if the predicate felony is an assault, 
battery, or includes assaultive behavior that is an integral part of 
the killing, it merges with the homicide; thereby, preventing a 
felony-murder charge.133  However, the jurisdictions that have 
chosen to use the merger doctrine still lack a unified application 
of that limitation.134 
127. Ohio textually requires the proximate cause limitation, while Illinois judiciary
reads in the limitation.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (West 1974); see People v. Space, 
103 N.E.3d 1019, 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). 
128. The Maine statute states:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution . . . [if] the defendant . . . [d]id not 
commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure or 
aid the commission thereof; . . . [w]as not armed with a dangerous weapon, or 
other weapon which under circumstances indicated a readiness to inflict 
serious bodily injury; . . . [r]easonably believed that no other participant was 
armed with such a weapon; and . . . [r]easonably believed that no other 
participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious 
bodily injury. 
ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 202 (1991).  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1975). 
129. Ohio statutorily requires the death be the proximate cause of committing or
attempting to commit the felony and judicially chooses to reject the merger doctrine.  OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02; see State v. Cherry, No. 20771, 2002 WL 1626105, at *5 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2002). 
130. Delaware defines murder in the first degree “[w]hile engaged in the commission
of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any felony, the 
person recklessly causes the death of another person.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
131. The merger doctrine is also referred to as the independent-felony or collateral-
felony limitation.  DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 527-28.  Compare Huntley v. State, 518 
S.E.2d 890, 893 (Ga. 1999) (declining to adopt the merger rule), with State v. Comitz, 443 
P.3d 1130, 1134 (N.M. 2019) (applying collateral-felony rule).
132. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 528.
133. Id.
134. Courts differ on applying the merger doctrine to felonies that involve assaultive
conduct, such as kidnapping.  See People v. Escobar, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 883, 890-91 (Cal. Ct. 
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The shifting and unpredictable application of the felony-
murder rule across all fifty states, not surprisingly, produces 
inconsistent charging results.135  With every state seemingly 
limiting and applying the doctrine differently, it begs the question 
of whether an optimal reform solution exists.  
III. JUDICIARY EMPOWERMENT
Since the felony-murder doctrine’s arrival in the United 
States, courts have frequently stepped in to limit the rule in the 
absence of statutory limitations.136  First, Part III(A) introduces 
Torres v. State as an example, showing the judiciary narrowly 
construing felony-murder through a new jurisdictional limitation.  
Part III(B) explains how jurisdictional statutes operate in relation 
to specific felonies and how that analysis changes with felony-
murder offenses.  Next, the Part examines how jurisdictional 
statutes, if interpreted correctly, can limit certain intrastate 
felony-murder offenses.137  Part III(B) concludes that legislative 
efforts to cabin felony-murder have not worked; instead, 
inconsistent textual legislative revisions have only produced 
ambiguity while preserving nationwide unfettered prosecutorial 
charging.  Part III(B) then proposes that if jurisdictions continue 
to retain the felony-murder doctrine, a harmonious limitation is 
needed and recommends a uniform “textual nexus” judicial 
interpretation will suffice to produce a proactive and consistent 
reform movement.   
Part III(C) takes a second look at Torres and the appropriate 
interpretation of Arkansas’ extraterritorial statute.  Although the 
Torres majority’s jurisdictional limitation was a misguided 
interpretation of Arkansas’ extraterritorial statute in an attempt to 
narrow the scope of felony-murder, the spirit to limit the doctrine 
was sound.  Part III(C) then applies the proposed harmonious 
“textual nexus” judicial interpretation to the Torres facts. 
App. 1996); State v. Styers, 865 P.2d 765, 773 (Ariz. 1993).  See also DRESSLER, supra note 
12, at 529.  
135. See generally supra Part II and accompanying discussion.
136. See generally supra Part II and accompanying discussion.
137. See, e.g., People v. Stokes, 671 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Holt,
440 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Ill. 1982). 
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A. Arkansas’ Attempt
Trial by jury is a rarity in our current criminal justice 
system—occurring in fewer than three percent (3%) of state and 
federal cases.138  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, application of 
felony-murder during a recent trial in Arkansas received heavy 
media attention.139  Arkansas’s expansive textual adoption of the 
felony murder rule140 provides the state a wide latitude to charge 
a defendant and pursue the death penalty.141  Arkansas is one of 
twenty-eight states that legalizes capital punishment and has 
arguably been center-stage in the death penalty debate since 2017 
138. Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws., The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right
to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It (2018), [https://perma.cc/P8Q7-
HAVM]. 
139. Allie Lynch, Juror on Torres Trial Speaks About Shocking Arkansas Supreme
Court Ruling, 5NEWS (Apr. 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/XJ7H-CEZG]; Benjamin Hardy, 
State Supreme Court Orders New Trial in Torres Capital Murder Case, ARK. TIMES (Apr. 
18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3MHF-FVY4] [hereinafter Hardy, New Trial in Torres]; 
Benjamin Hardy, Update: Mauricio Torres Found Guilty of Capital Murder in Death of 6-
year-old Son, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), [https://perma.cc/L2LC-T8DW] [hereinafter 
Hardy, Update]; Benjamin Hardy, A Child Beaten, Slain Despite Red Flags, ARK. TIMES 
(Apr. 22, 2015), [https://perma.cc/R4V6-PAJR] [hereinafter Hardy, Child Beaten].  A 
television reporter was found in contempt of court and sentenced to three days in jail for 
recording a hearing in the Torres proceeding.  Arkansas TV Reporter Gets 3-day Sentence 
for Taping in Court, KATV (Nov. 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4KNV-4J8G]. 
140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
141. The capital murder statute textually differs by creating an enumerated list of
applicable felonies.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (2019).  Arkansas’s capital murder statute 
states: 
A person commits capital murder if . . . [a]cting alone or with one . . . or more 
other persons . . . [t]he person commits or attempts to commit: (i) Terrorism, 
as defined in § 5-54-205; (ii) Rape, § 5-14-103; (iii) Kidnapping, § 5-11-102; 
(iv) Vehicular piracy, § 5-11-105; (v) Robbery, § 5-12-102; (vi) Aggravated
robbery, § 5-12-103; (vii) Residential burglary, § 5-39-201(a); (viii)
Commercial burglary, § 5-39-201(b); (ix) Aggravated residential burglary, §
5-39-204; (x) A felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
§§ 5-64-101—5-64-508, involving an actual delivery of a controlled
substance; or (xi) First degree escape, § 5-54-110; and . . . [i]n the course of
and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the
person or an accomplice causes the death of a person under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life . . . [or] . . .
[a]cting alone or with one . . . or more other persons . . . [t]he person commits
or attempts to commit arson, § 5-38-301; and . . . [i]n the course of and in
furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the person or
an accomplice causes the death of any person . . . . 
 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101. 
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when it executed four inmates in an eight-day span.142  Statewide 
attention continued when 2019 headlines described Torres v. 
State,143 a local boy’s brutal death caused by his father’s rape and 
chronic child abuse.144  Arkansas news intently followed and 
published details of what became a capital murder case revealing 
the failed 2014 Department of Human Services (DHS) 
investigation of the young boy’s possible abuse.145  It is not 
surprising, then, that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s reversal146 of 
the felony-murder conviction involving egregious facts and a 
capital punishment sentencing, further enhanced the state’s 
curiosity.147   
To fully appreciate Torres, one must first understand 
Arkansas’ unique combination of textual and judicial limitations 
to felony-murder.148  The Arkansas murder statute states:  
A person commits murder in the first degree if . . . [a]cting 
alone or with one . . . or more other persons . . . [t]he person 
commits or attempts to commit a felony; and . . . [i]n the 
course of and in the furtherance of the felony or in immediate 
flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes 
the death of any person under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life . . . .149  
142. Death Penalty Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/V6ER-NSHP].
Four of the eight inmates were executed.  Id. 
143. Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 1, 571 S.W.3d 456, 456.
144. See Hardy, Child Beaten, supra note 139; Zuzanna Sitek, Bella Vista Boy’s Death
Caused by Rape and Chronic Child Abuse, Prosecutor Says, 5NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015), 
[https://perma.cc/F9DC-J9MD]. 
145. Hardy, Child Beaten, supra note 139.  The case sparked several potential DHS
policy changes, including additional staff training on performing searches, changes to the 
system itself and requiring local offices to keep unsubstantiated reports for a longer period 
of time.  Id.  Further, the Torres case got additional media coverage because of the 
astronomical cost associated with capital murder trials.  Tracy Neal, Torres, Holly Cases 
Show Cost for Defense, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Mar. 19, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/QGL3-ELVL] [hereinafter Neal, Cost for Defense].  Torres’ case total cost 
including, the defense, prosecutors’ and jurors’ expenses, totaled $102,904.  Id. 
146. Torres was reversed and remanded for new trial in February of 2020.  Torres,
2019 Ark. 101, at 15, 571 S.W.3d at 465; New Trial Date Set for Mauricio Torres in Benton 
County, 4029 NEWS (Oct. 7, 2019), [https://perma.cc/R5HQ-GSH5]. 
147. Hardy, New Trial in Torres, supra note 139; Lynch, supra note 139; Neal, Cost
for Defense, supra note 145. 
148. See generally infra pp. 22-24 and accompanying discussion.
149. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
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Textually, the statute does not spell out which felonies 
qualify as predicates for felony-murder.150  Rather, Arkansas 
requires that a death occur in the course of and in furtherance of 
any felony.151  Moreover, the statute textually extends liability to 
co-felon deaths and those that occur in immediate flight from the 
felony but limits application to deaths caused by either the 
defendant or an accomplice.152  Finally, Arkansas requires an 
additional mens rea of manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life.153  
Beyond statutory limitations, the Arkansas judiciary has 
followed the historical pattern of pursuing other ways to limit the 
doctrine by, for example, applying its own version of the merger 
doctrine.154  Rather than merge every assaultive felony, it requires 
the felony and the murder to have independent objectives—
regardless of the conduct’s assaultive nature.155  Thus, for the 
felony-murder rule to apply, “the defendant must have an intent 
or objective to commit the underlying felony as opposed to the 
primary goal of murder.”156  If the defendant unlawfully entered 
a home intending to commit murder, then the defendant could not 
be charged with felony-murder using burglary as the predicate 
felony.157  By contrast, felony-murder applies to the defendant 
who shoots at an occupied car with intent to cause property 
150. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102.
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102.
152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102.  Doing so eliminates liability when a police officer
or a victim causes a death. 
153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102.  Having the mindset of extreme indifference to the
value of human life is typically considered a second-degree murder type killing.  See ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-10-103 (2005).  The defendant must consciously disregard a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of causing the general social harm, death.  See DRESSLER, supra note 12, 
at 519.  Substantive is a gross deviation from the way a reasonable person would approach 
seen through extremely reckless behavior towards human life.  Id.  Determining an 
unjustifiable risk, involves balancing the risk of the harm, here death, and the probability of 
the harm with the defendant’s reason for acting.  Id.  If the risk of harm and probability 
outweigh the defendant’s reason, the risk is unjustifiable.  Id. 
154. See Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, at 4-6, 516 S.W.3d 727, 730-31.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 5, 516 S.W.3d at 731; see also Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 427, 731
S.W.2d 756, 759 (1987); Craig v. State, 70 Ark. App. 71, 80-81, 14 S.W.3d 893, 899 (2000). 
157. See Parker, 292 Ark. at 427, 731 S.W.2d at 759.
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damage and in the course and furtherance of that felony, causes 
the death of another.158 
Arkansas courts tend to further undermine the legislature 
through the interpretation of the doctrine as applied to co-felon 
actions.159  Through an Arkansas Model Jury Instruction, the 
courts instruct the jury that when two or more persons are 
criminally responsible for an offense, each person is liable only 
for the degree of the offense consistent with that defendant’s own 
culpable mental state.160  The instruction allows accomplice 
felons having negligent mindsets to mitigate a first-degree murder 
charge requiring extreme indifference to the value of human life 
to a lesser included offense.161 
Arkansas courts have introduced one other felony-murder 
limitation that does little to actually limit the doctrine.162  That 
arose when it interpreted “immediate flight” by construing the 
plain language of the word “immediate.”163  However, it offered 
no other guidance for the jury to consider when determining what 
constitutes “reasonabl[e] temporal event[s].”164  By contrast, 
other courts have held that flight ends once the defendant reaches 
“a place of temporary safety”165 or is in “complete custody.”166 
The Arkansas judiciary addressed the felony-murder 
doctrine again in 2019.167  In Torres, Mauricio Torres, a resident 
of Bella Vista, Arkansas, took his family on a camping trip to 
nearby Missouri.168  He and his wife, Cathy Torres, awoke one 
158. See Noble, 2017 Ark. 142, at 5-6, 516 S.W.3d at 731 (finding the independent
objective to commit terroristic acts rather than murder). 
159. See Binder, Making the Best, supra note 11, at 513 n.687.
160. The accomplice jury instruction states: “[w]hen two or more persons are
criminally responsible for an offense, each person is liable only for the degree of the offense 
that is consistent with the person’s own [culpable mental state] [or] [accountability for an 
aggravating fact or circumstance].”  1 ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIM. AMCI 2d 
405 (2020) (brackets in original). 
161. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (2017).  Felony manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of first-degree felony-murder.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(4) (2007). 
162. Kauffeld v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 440, at 7-8, 528 S.W.3d 302, 308-09.
163. Id. at 7-8, 528 S.W.3d at 308-09.  The court defined “immediate” according to the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition: “a reasonable time in view of particular facts and 
circumstances of the case under consideration.”  Id. at 8, 528 S.W.3d at 308.   
164. Id. at 8, 528 S.W.3d at 308-09.
165. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
167. See Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14, 571 S.W.3d 456, 465.
168. Id. at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466 (Womack, J., dissenting).
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morning to discover their six-year-old son, Isaiah, had eaten a 
piece of cake for breakfast.169  As punishment, Torres inserted a 
stick into his son’s rectum and forced him to do squats.170  
Displeased with Isaiah’s performance, Cathy pushed Isaiah down, 
driving the stick deeper and piercing the child’s rectum.171  By the 
time the family returned home to Bella Vista that night, Isaiah 
was unresponsive.172  Nearing midnight, Torres called for medical 
care; however, Isaiah soon died after transport to a Benton County 
hospital.173 
At trial, the state spent three days building its case with 
overwhelming evidence against Torres.174  Isaiah’s nine-year-old 
sister, who witnessed years of abuse leading up to the camping 
trip, and the forensic pathologist who examined Isaiah’s body, 
were both called to testify.175  The defense rested without calling 
169. Id. at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466; see also Benjamin Hardy, As Torres Trial Nears
End, Jury Hears Graphic Details of Alleged Child Abuse, Autopsy, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 10, 
2016), [https://perma.cc/NK2J-FWTF] [hereinafter Hardy, Graphic Details]. 
170. See Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466 (Womack, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466-67.
174. Hardy, Update, supra note 139.
175. Isaiah’s sister testified to witnessing repeated beatings and abuse to her brother,
including, “a lot” of hitting with a stick or cable.  Hardy, Graphic Details, supra note 169. 
She also testified that Isaiah would have marks, be in pain, and scream or cry during the 
abuse.  Id.  She told the court Isaiah was forced to sleep in a cage and that the was not allowed 
to eat the same food as his sisters.  Id.  The sister testified witnessing her father once pour 
bleach over Isaiah’s back, giving him chemical burns, and her father forcing Isaiah to eat his 
father’s feces.  Id.; Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 19, 571 S.W.3d at 467 (Womack, J., dissenting).  
The chemical exposure was later confirmed and discovered from a 2014 examination at 
Children’s Hospital in Little Rock, alleged as an accident.  Hardy, Graphic Details, supra 
note 169.  The medical examiner’s testimony corroborated the sister’s testimony of chronic 
abuse by presenting graphic autopsy photos of extensive bruising in different stages of 
recovery, scars, puncture wounds, and lacerations covering his torso, head, back, face, 
mouth, legs, abdomen, and internal organs.  Id.; Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 
467.  The doctor affirmed that Isaiah died from the ultimate fatal issue of acute fecal purulent
peritonitis, a bacterial infection in the abdomen cavity due to traumatic disruption of his
rectum from a foreign object, but Isaiah also was subjected to a prolonged period of abuse.
Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 18-19, 571 S.W.3d at 467; Hardy, Graphic Details, supra note
169. The autopsy revealed thick scar tissue lining Isaiah’s skull cap from repeated,
significant, and traumatic head injuries and multiple acute blunt force injuries to his head,
back, and abdomen.  Torres, 2019 Ark. 101 at 19, 571 S.W.3d at 467.  His teeth had been
forcibly removed and he had defensive wounds on his hands and arms.  Id. at 19, 571 S.W.3d
at 467.  Moreover, upon investigation, Isaiah’s blood was found splattered throughout the
Torres home and camper.  Id.
2020 A QUIET WAR 597 
any witnesses.176  After a short deliberation,177 the jury 
unanimously convicted Torres of capital murder and sentenced 
him to death.178 
But the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed Torres’ 
conviction and sentence.179  In a 4-3 decision, the Court held that 
Arkansas did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged rape; 
the trial court therefore lacked authority to permit a conviction on 
a felony-murder charge predicated on rape.180  The court reasoned 
there were two opportunities for Arkansas’ extraterritorial 
jurisdiction statute to apply: first, “the conduct—the alleged 
rape—occur[ed] within Arkansas,” or second, “[the] result that is 
an element of the offense—the alleged rape—occur[ed] within 
Arkansas.”181  The court found that Arkansas’ extraterritorial 
jurisdiction did not to reach the alleged rape because the conduct 
occurred entirely in Missouri, and the result—death—is not an 
element of rape.182  Further, the court reasoned, if “the elements 
of rape could not have been met in this state . . . rape cannot serve 
as an element of capital [felony] murder.”183  The court held that 
a rape-felony-murder charge was legally insufficient, and because 
of the prosecution’s use of a general verdict form,184 the jury 
possibly convicted Torres on an inadequate theory.185 
The dissent accused the majority of “misunderstanding . . .  
[Arkansas’] extraterritorial jurisdiction statute[.]”186  After 
176. Hardy, Update, supra note 139.
177. Id.
178. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 1, 571 S.W.3d at 458 (majority).  Torres was also found
guilty of first-degree battery.  Id. 
179. Id. at 15, 571 S.W.3d at 465; Hardy, New Trial in Torres, supra note 139.  A juror
in the case told a news station that the Torres trial was “two weeks she will remember for the 
rest of her life.” and she could not believe the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision to overturn 
his conviction.  Lynch, supra note 139. 
180. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14-15, 571 S.W.3d at 464-65.
181. Id. at 11, 571 S.W.3d at 463; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104 (1975).
182. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 11, 571 S.W.3d at 463.
183. Id. at 13-14, 571 S.W.3d at 464.
184. A general verdict form directs the jury to find the ultimate issue without list
specific theories, findings, or disputed issues.  See General Verdict, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
[https://perma.cc/K43Z-N8YY] (last visited Nov. 25, 2019). 
185. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14-15, 571 S.W.3d at 465.  Under these circumstances,
where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, the court requires the 
verdict to be set aside because it is impossible to determine which ground the jury selected. 
Id.  
186. Id. at 17, 571 S.W.3d at 466 (Womack, J., dissenting).
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detailing the horrific facts the majority omitted, the dissent 
explained felony-murder, rather than rape, was the “offense” that 
should have been analyzed.187  The dissent reasoned, because 
Torres was charged with felony murder predicated on rape, the 
underlying felony—rape—is only needed to replace the required 
mens rea for murder.188  Therefore, for jurisdictional purposes, 
the state did not need jurisdiction over the predicate felony; 
rather, only the felony-murder that was charged.189  Based on this 
understanding, Arkansas would have jurisdiction to charge for 
Isaiah’s death because “the elements of capital felony murder 
include (1) the attempt or commission of an underlying felony, 
and (2) the resulting death of a person.”190  The dissent concluded 
that the “plain language of [Arkansas’] extraterritorial jurisdiction 
statute ma[d]e[] clear that Arkansas ha[d] jurisdiction to convict 
Torres of felony murder for the Arkansas death of his son, Isaiah, 
predicated on the Missouri rape.”191 
Mauricio Torres is currently held without bond in the 
Bentonville county jail awaiting his second jury trial rescheduled 
for February 18, 2020.192  The prosecution has stated that during 
retrial, it still plans on pursuing the death penalty for the 
remaining child-abuse murder theory.193 
B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 101
States’ extraterritorial jurisdiction statutes govern their 
ability to prosecute a criminal defendant whose crime was not 
wholly intrastate, and while specific statutory language may 
slightly vary, states generally take the same approach.194  Statutes 
typically permit an exercise of jurisdiction by any state in which 
187. Id. at 20-21, 571 S.W.3d at 468.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 20-21, 571 S.W.3d at 468.
190. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 21, 571 S.W.3d at 468 (Womack, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 23, 571 S.W.3d at 469.
192. Tracy Neal, Judge Sets Retrial Date for Northwest Arkansas Man Accused of
Killing Son, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/BFZ9-BAKJ] 
[hereinafter Neal, Retrial]. 
193. Lynch, supra note 139.
194. See generally Wendell Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle,
30 MICH. L. REV. 238, 253-59 (1932) (discussing further the specific ways statutes expand 
jurisdiction). 
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either the conduct or the result of a crime occurred.195  Then to 
convict, the prosecution must prove both the conduct and result 
aspects of a crime. 196  The actus reus and mens rea make up the 
criminal conduct portion of an offense.197  The actus reus, the 
external part of an offense, includes (1) a voluntary act, and (2) a 
social harm.198  The mens rea is the mental culpability required 
for criminal liability.199  For conduct-based crimes, the analysis 
stops there because the social harm society wishes to deter is the 
conduct itself.200  However, when the harmful result is the activity 
society wants to prevent, an additional result component is 
required.201  The criminal result portion for result-based crimes 
consists of the actual and proximate causation analysis, 
necessarily linking the defendant’s voluntary act to the 
“result[ing]” social harm.202   
Examples are often helpful.  For instance, possession of a 
controlled substance is solely a conduct crime because having 
illegal drugs is the criminal conduct society wishes to prevent.203  
Larceny is another conduct-based offense.204  Once the 
prosecution has proved the taking and carrying away of personal 
property with the intent to permanently deprive, the resulting 
deprival is irrelevant because the criminal conduct of “taking . . . 
personal property of another with the intent to permanently 
deprive the possessor” is what society wishes to prohibit.205   
On the other hand, criminal homicide is arguably the most 
straight forward result-based crime because the social harm—the 
killing of a human being by another human being—is the harmful 
result society prohibits.206  “Criminal homicide” is further divided 
195. See Larry Kramer, Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1431, 1437-38 (1983).  See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-108 (1978); MINN. STAT. § 
609.025 (1986). 
196. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 193-94 (4th ed. 2006).
197. Id. at 91.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 125.
200. See id. at 193.
201. See DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 193.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 193-94.
204. See id. at 592.
205. Id.
206. DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 539.
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by statute into “murder” and other lesser included forms like 
“manslaughter” depending on the requisite mens rea of the 
defendant.207  The specific statute’s textual mens rea requirement 
greatly regulates what homicide conviction is appropriate for the 
defendant’s actions and mindset.208  Further, to ensure conviction, 
the prosecution must prove the causation link that the defendant’s 
voluntary act caused the resulting killing.209  Rape is another 
result-based crime; the harmful result that society wishes to 
protect against is forcible sexual intercourse.210  To convict for 
rape, the prosecution would have to prove the defendant engaged 
in sexual intercourse by force without consent of the victim.211  
However, unlike the specific mens rea outlined in differing 
homicide statutes, the defendant is guilty of rape if he possessed 
any morally blameworthy state of mind.212  Although the 
causation analysis in a rape is rarely litigated, the defendant’s 
voluntary act—intercourse—must result in the forcible, non-
consensual intercourse outlined in the statute.213 
The analysis changes when one of these conduct or result-based 
crimes serves as the predicate felony in a felony-murder 
charge.214  Prosecution of felony-murder requires that a death 
result from the commission of a felony.215  The intent to commit 
the predicate felony constitutes the specific mens rea otherwise 
required for murder.216  Thus, the felony-murder rule applies if 
the predicate felony’s conduct, including its actus reus and mens 
rea, results in a death.217  For example, when rape is the predicate 
felony in a felony-murder charge, the intent-to-rape mens rea 
replaces the typical murder intent-to-kill mens rea requirement.218  
207. Id. at 543.
208. See id. at 547-55.
209. Id. at 193-94.
210. Id. at 625-28.
211. DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 626-28.  Statute language and judiciary
interpretation of rape statutes varies greatly from state to state.  Id. 
212. Id. at 637-38.  Defendant’s mental culpability may be excused for genuine and
reasonable mistakes to consent or force in limited circumstances.  Id. 
213. Id. at 625.
214. Id. at 557.
215. Id.
216. DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 557.
217. See id.
218. See.id. at 557.
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Therefore, the rape accounts for the conduct portion of a felony-
murder charge.219  Another change with felony-murder is the 
causation analysis, which critically no longer focuses on the 
predicate felony.220  Rather, in a felony-murder prosecution, the 
harmful result society wishes to protect against is death.221  Per 
the above explanation, the following chart demonstrates the 
important changes in the analysis. 
 
 
There is another layer added when the felony-murder’s 
predicate felony occurs in one state, but the resulting death occurs 
in another.222  Generally, a state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction 
statute provides that state has the ability to prosecute a rape 
felony-murder if either the conduct—rape—or the result—
death—happened within its borders.223  Therefore, the state in 
which the death occurred would have jurisdiction over the 
defendant for a felony-murder charge, regardless of the 
extraterritorial rape.   
Using jurisdictional restrictions is a plausible way to regulate 
felony-murder charges.  Courts in New York and Illinois have 
attempted to confer jurisdiction in a way that limits the felony-
murder charging applicability.224  New York upheld the state’s 
jurisdiction over a prosecution for felony-murder of an in-state 
death resulting from a felony committed in Connecticut.225  In 
People v. Stokes, after witnessing an armed robbery in 
Connecticut, detectives pursued the getaway car of the two 
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 559-60, 567.
222. See generally Kramer, supra note 195, at 1431-44.
223. See id. at 1439-41.
224. People v. Stokes, 671 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Holt, 440 N.E.2d
102, 104-05 (Ill. 1982). 
225. Stokes, 671 N.E.2d at 1264.
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fleeing individuals.226  A highspeed chase ensued, which crossed 
New York state lines.227  Attempting to evade capture, the 
getaway car eventually crossed an intersection and rammed into 
a glass bus shelter, ultimately killing a woman inside.228  The New 
York Court of Appeals held that New York had jurisdiction to 
prosecute the defendant for felony-murder because the death of a 
nonparticipant in New York, in the course and furtherance of a 
designated felony or immediate flight therefrom, constitutes an 
element of the crime of felony-murder.229 
In People v. Holt, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it did 
not have jurisdiction over a death that occurred in Wisconsin 
although the predicate felony—kidnapping—originated in 
Illinois.230  The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that conviction 
for the predicate felony is not an element of felony-murder with 
independent significance; rather, the predicate felony is only a 
precondition to the ultimate charge of felony-murder because the 
felon could not do anything “in the course of and in furtherance 
of” without a felony.231  The court held that the murder was not 
in furtherance of the kidnapping and therefore not “conduct which 
is an element of the offense.”232 
Although conferring jurisdiction between states does limit a 
small portion of interstate felony-murder prosecutions, thereby 
adding yet another judicial limitation into the mix, inconsistent 
prosecutorial charging discretion persists.  Admittedly, Stokes 
and Holt addressed wholly interstate felony murders, but those 
judiciaries’ focus on whether the death occurred “in the course of 
and in furtherance of” the particular felony provides a blueprint 
for judicially limiting all felony-murder prosecutions.233  
Focusing on this language can narrow the application of felony-
murder while encouraging prosecutors to replace felony-murder 
charges with a more narrowly-tailored offense. 
226. Id. at 1261.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1264.
230. People v. Holt, 440 N.E.2d 102, 104-05 (Ill. 1982).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 106-07; Stokes, 671 N.E.2d at 1262.
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As noted in Part II, state statutes currently use four 
predominate textual phrases related to the nexus between the 
felony and the murder.234  Requiring that the death in some way 
furthers the underlying felony creates a nexus that the judiciary 
can proactively enforce despite the textual language with which 
it is presented.235  Although only eleven states have the exact 
textual language “in the course of and in furtherance of” in their 
statutes,236 the judiciary should interpret that language to require 
a “felony-death nexus.”237  To be sure, many jurisdictions have 
judicially already adopted that or a similar limitation,238 but 
continued judicial adoption and strict interpretation is needed to 
advance uniformity. 
C. Textbook Theory into Arkansas Application
The Torres prosecution caused an unsettling felony-murder 
outcome.  This time, however, the imbalance arose from another 
attempt to judicially limit felony-murder’s use in favor of a new 
court-imposed jurisdictional limitation.239  The Torres dissent 
234. See infra Appendix IV.  This map identifies which state statutes use particular
nexus language.  Originally, I believed a pattern might emerge through the circuits; however, 
the only pattern seems to possibly be geographical. 
235. Although Illinois statute did not textually require the limitation, the judiciary read
in the limitation by requiring the death be a part of “one continuous plan, design and 
intent[.]”  Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 106-07. 
236. See infra Appendix IV.  This map identifies which state statutes use particular
nexus language.  Originally, I believed a pattern might emerge through the circuits; however, 
the only pattern seems to possibly be geographical.  
237. The Illinois and New York respective statutes varied greatly—one enumerating
specific felonies and textually requiring “in the course of and in furtherance of” limitation 
and the other having neither textual limitation present—yet both applied the in the course of 
and in furtherance of limitation.  Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 105-07; Stokes, 671 N.E.2d at 1262. 
238. See, e.g., Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 339-40 (Del. 2009); Lee v. United States,
699 A.2d 373, 385-86 (D.C. 1997); Lester v. State, 737 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999); State v. Hokenson, 527 P.2d 487, 492 (Idaho 1974); State v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d 
124, 127 (Kan. 1974); Mumford v. State 313 A.2d 563, 566 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); 
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Mass. 1990); State ex rel. Murphy v. 
McKinnon, 556 P.2d 906, 910 (Mont. 1976); Romero v. State, 164 N.W. 554, 555 (Neb. 
1917); Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 434-35 (Nev. 2007); Gore v. Leeke, 199 S.E.2d 755, 759 
(S.C. 1973); State v. Pierce, 23 S.W.3d 289, 294-95 (Tenn. 2000); Haskell v. 
Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (Va. 1978); State ex rel. Painter v. Zakaib, 411 S.E.2d 
25, 26 (W. Va. 1991).  See also Binder, Making the Best, supra note 11, at 518 & n.727. 
239. Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 1, 571 S.W.3d at 458.  Torres’ second jury trial
was originally scheduled to begin January 21, 2020.  Id. 
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rightfully concluded that the majority misinterpreted the 
jurisdictional analysis of felony-murder.   
The analysis of Arkansas’ specific extraterritorial 
jurisdiction statute should look familiar.  In Arkansas, in order for 
a court to have jurisdiction over an offense, “[e]ither the conduct 
or a result that is an element of the offense [must] occur[] within 
th[e] state.”240  Mauricio Torres was charged with was capital 
felony-murder;241 “the elements of capital felony murder include 
(1) the attempt or commission of an underlying felony, and (2)
the resulting death of a person.”242  Likewise, the statute notes in
subsection (b), when the offense is homicide, as it is here for
felony-murder, either the death of the victim or the physical
contact causing death constitutes a “result” for purposes of
jurisdiction.243  Therefore, Isaiah’s in-state death is a “result” for
jurisdictional purposes.244  The Torres majority declined to adopt
this analysis despite the dissent’s repeated scrutiny of the flaws in
the majority’s reasoning.245  For support, the dissent cited
Arkansas precedent,246 the controlling state statute,247 and other
persuasive authority to show Arkansas’ clear jurisdiction to
charge Mauricio Torres with felony-murder.248
Consider this Article’s proposed textual interpretation of the 
nexus phrasing “in the course of and in furtherance of” as applied 
to the Torres facts.  It still produces the same outcome reached by 
the Torres majority, but does so without misapplying the 
territorial jurisdiction limitation.  Arkansas is primed to judicially 
adopt this Article’s proposal; after all, the felony-murder statute 
240. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(a)(1) (1975).
241. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 20-21, 571 S.W.3d 456, 468 (Womack, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 21, 571 S.W.3d at 468.
243. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(b).
244. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(b); Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 10-11, 571 S.W.3d at
462-63 (majority).
245. Torres, 2019 Ark.101, at 20-23, 571 S.W.3d at 467-69 (Womack, J., dissenting).
246. Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 748, 569 S.W.2d 74, 78 (1978).  In Gardner, the
defendant argued there was no evidence that the alleged rape took place in Arkansas; 
therefore, it would not have jurisdiction.  Id.  The court held that “if the requisite elements 
of the crime are committed in different jurisdictions, any state in which an essential part of 
the crime is committed may take jurisdiction.”  Id. (citing State v. Scofield, 7 Ariz. App. 307, 
438 P.2d 776 (1968)). 
247. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(b); Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 10-11, 571 S.W.3d at
462-63 (majority).
248. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 22-23, 571 S.W.3d at 468-69 (Womack, J., dissenting).
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already includes the textual “in the course of and in furtherance 
of” language.249  In Torres, the felony—rape—was complete 
before the later death.250  The rape started and concluded in 
Missouri, hours before Isaiah’s death in Arkansas.251  Therefore, 
the death was not in the course of, and nor did it further, the 
rape.252  This strict reading allows a court to limit the felony-
murder doctrine as applied to both intra- and interstate felony-
murders, thereby providing an interpretive model for other courts 
seeking to uniformly narrow the doctrine.   
CONCLUSION 
Reform of the felony-murder doctrine began almost 
contemporaneously with its creation.  But legislative textual 
amendments have not fixed the ongoing felony-murder charging 
and application inconsistencies.  With only two jurisdictions 
having completely abolished the doctrine, a “next-best” solution 
for uniform reform is for the judiciary to strictly interpret the 
statutory phrase “in the course of and in furtherance of” to create 
a nexus between the underlying felony and the death it produced.  
If legislators are determined to maintain felony-murder as a part 
of this nation’s law, the courts should feel empowered by the 
Arkansas judiciary’s proactive spirit to limit the doctrine’s 
applicability and reach. 
249. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
250. See Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14, 571 S.W.3d at 465 (Womack, J., dissenting).
251. See id.
252. This Article does not purport justifying Mauricio Torres’ actions.  Not only does
the felony-murder doctrine cause ambiguity, too often the doctrine is used as a redundant 
homicide source when the death reasonably could have been charged under a different 
homicide method.  This Article rather views the judiciary’s effort to limit the felony-murder 
doctrine, despite the heinous facts, as the court’s expression of disdain toward the felony-
murder’s expansive application. 
606 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:3 
Appendix I 
Forty-seven state statutes that have textually adopted 
felony-murder: 
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100 
(2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2009); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2020); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
54c (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 
782.04 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2014); IDAHO CODE § 
18-4003 (2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2020); IND. CODE §
35-42-1-1 (2018); IOWA CODE § 707.2 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5402 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2015); ME. STAT. tit.
17-a, § 202 (1991); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201 (West
2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 1 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.316 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (2014); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-19 (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.021 (2017);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303
(2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:1-a (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27
(McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2017); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16.01 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02
(West 1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 (2012); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.115 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (1978); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-23-1 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2005);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202 (2009); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
19.02 (West 1994); 2009 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West
2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-32 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A-32-030 (1975); W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-1 (1991); WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (2019); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-101 (2013).
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Appendix II 
Thirty-five states’ statutes enumerating particular 
felonies: 
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100 
(2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2009); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 189 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2019); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54c (2015); FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2019); 
IDAHO CODE § 18-4003 (2002); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2018); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 17-a, § 202 (1991); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2019); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.316 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (2014); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.030 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (2018); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27
(McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2017); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16.01 (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 (2012);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2019); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1
(2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2005); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-202 (2018); 2009 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203
(West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2018); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-32 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1975);
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1991); WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (2019); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (2013).
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